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I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of this symposium is whether Justice Scalia was a friend 
or foe of criminal defendants. At first glance, Justice Scalia may appear 
to have been something of a “friend” as he authored a number of 
opinions ruling against law enforcement: Kyllo v. United States, which 
held that the use of a thermal scanner to detect excess heat constituted a 
search for Fourth Amendment purposes;1 Arizona v. Hicks, which held 
that a police officer conducted a search when he shifted a stereo system 
slightly to be able to see the serial numbers (which revealed that the 
equipment had been stolen);2 Arizona v. Gant, where he provided the 
crucial fifth vote to overrule the overly expansive interior car search rule 
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.
1. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
2. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987). 
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from New York v. Belton;3 Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. 
Washington, which re-invigorated the Confrontation Clause;4 and 
Blakely v. Washington, which extended the Apprendi rule to sentencing 
guidelines (and ultimately threatened the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).5 
To be sure, there is no reason to think that, in writing those 
opinions, Justice Scalia was motivated to favor criminal defendants. 
Indeed, in other cases, he authored important opinions that greatly 
expanded police discretion, such as Whren v. United States.6 Rather, 
Crawford, Blakely, and other opinions reflect his fidelity to his 
constitutional vision of originalism. Nevertheless, these cases are often 
offered as legitimate examples of how he did not have a purely results-
oriented approach to deciding criminal procedure issues. 
Yet, a closer examination of Justice Scalia’s “defendant-favorable” 
opinions suggests that the results often have an air of unreality to them. 
In practice, there is no way for the police to change their behavior to 
address the identified unconstitutional action (in contrast to, say, reading 
Miranda warnings to dispel the inherent coerciveness of police custody), 
or if there is a way for the police to respond, it would be expanding the 
scope of criminal liability in ways that worsen the predicament for future 
criminal defendants. 
In this Article, I focus on one of the Bush era war-on-terrorism 
cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,7 in which the Court held that an American 
citizen captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan could be detained as an 
enemy combatant pursuant to the congressional Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), but was entitled to legal representation and 
some kind of hearing to contest his combatant status.8 In Part II, I take a 
closer look at Hamdi and review the facts, procedural history, and 
Justice Scalia’s dissent (joined by only Justice Stevens), where he 
argued that the Constitution prohibited such military detention of 
citizens and that the government’s options were either (1) to charge the 
citizen with a crime or (2) to seek congressional suspension of the writ 
3. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350-51 (2009) (overruling New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981)).  
4. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813 (2006). 
5. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-05 (2004) (applying Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).  
6. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (holding that pretextual stops did not
violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the police officer had objective valid reasonable suspicion 
to justify the stop). 
7. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
8. Id. at 509. 
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of habeas corpus.9 Justice Scalia’s Hamdi dissent is often celebrated as a 
great civil liberties opinion in the vein of Ex parte Milligan10 (though, of 
course, it failed to carry the day, unlike Milligan).11 
It certainly sounds wonderful to declare that an American citizen 
should either face trial on criminal charges, with all of the due process 
that criminal defendants receive, or that the President should persuade 
Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus to allow military 
detention. But I argue that in practice, these are staggeringly bad options 
even from a civil libertarian standpoint, at least given the actual facts of 
Yaser Esam Hamdi’s capture and detention. Thus, Part III examines 
three possible outcomes that might have resulted if Justice Scalia’s view 
had prevailed in Hamdi: (1) the government might have been forced to 
release Hamdi for lack of provable charges, in which case he could have 
gone on the battlefield—and been lawfully targeted for killing (similar to 
the demise of Anwar al-Aulaqi); (2) Congress might have agreed to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus (which would have left Hamdi worse 
off than what the majority opinion provided him); or (3) he might have 
faced criminal charges based on a distorted notion of conspiracy that 
likely would have bled into domestic crimes. In short, this Article argues 
that Justice Scalia’s fidelity to his constitutional vision was admirable in 
its consistency, but it sometimes led to, or would have led to, results that 
simply could not be squared with the real world. 
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT HAMDI V. RUMSFELD
Many commentators have singled out Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld as a prime example of an opinion that favors the 
9. Id. at 555 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
11. Id. at 130-31; see, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Supreme Court Goes to War, in 
TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY COMBATANT 
CASES, 37, 63 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005) (“Who would have suspected that the most civil 
liberties–oriented opinion in Hamdi would be authored by Justice Scalia in an odd-couple dissent 
with Justice Stevens?”); Daniel R. Williams, After The Gold Rush - Part I: Hamdi, 9/11, and the 
Dark Side of the Enlightenment, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 349 (2007) (describing Scalia’s position 
as the “absolutist civil libertarian stance that restricts the power of the executive to detain enemy 
combatants to that extraordinary situation where the Great Writ has been suspended”); Steven G. 
Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023 
(2005) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)) (“Libertarian-
conservative Scalia took the view, which was joined by Justice Stevens, that enemy combatants who 
are citizens must always be either charged with treason or released, unless Congress has suspended 
the writ of habeas corpus. This is a strikingly libertarian position and one that I must say I agree 
with.”). 
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individual over the government.12 Justice Scalia did vote against the 
government on the merits of the case, and on first read, his reasoning for 
doing so calls for a strong protection of the citizen’s civil rights. 
However, when one delves deeper by asking, “What happens next?,” 
one concludes that Justice Scalia’s principles are either unworkable or 
constitute a Pyrrhic victory. 
On September 11, 2001, nineteen members of the terrorist group al 
Qaeda hijacked four American passenger planes and slammed two of 
them into the World Trade Center in New York and a third into the 
Pentagon.13 The fourth plane was believed to be targeting either the 
White House or the U.S. Capitol Building, but the passengers fought 
back and were prevented from taking control only because the hijackers 
intentionally crashed the plane into a field in Pennsylvania.14 One week 
later, Congress enacted, and President George Bush signed into law, an 
Authorization for Use of Military Force against those responsible for the 
9/11 attacks.15 Within two months, the U.S. Military launched air strikes 
in Afghanistan against al Qaeda (and their Taliban harborers) and 
infiltrated special operations units on the ground to coordinate with 
Northern Alliance fighters. Those Northern Alliance fighters captured 
several thousand suspected Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, including 
Yaser Esam Hamdi, turning them over to American forces. Hamdi was 
sent to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and a few 
months later to a U.S. naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia.16 
Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 
of his son in the Eastern District of Virginia, which appointed the newly-
installed federal public defender in the district (Frank Dunham) to 
represent Hamdi.17 The district judge ordered the government to provide 
Dunham access to Hamdi, but the government balked, arguing that it 
needed to isolate Hamdi to be able to interrogate him effectively.18 The 
government found a sympathetic audience in the Fourth Circuit, which 
reversed and remanded with directions for the district court to defer to 
the government’s security needs and to consider Hamdi’s combatant 
status.19 
12. See supra text accompanying note 11.
13. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 1-10 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMM’N REPORT]. 
14. Id. at 10-14. 
15. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
16. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
17. Id. at 511-12. 
18. Id. at 512.
19. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
4
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Evidently the district judge had a different concept of deference. 
The government had submitted a declaration by an official named 
Michael Mobbs that set forth the basis for the determination that Hamdi 
was an enemy combatant, but the district court rejected it as conclusory 
and ordered the government to produce a wide variety of documents—
such as interview notes, names and contact information for all of 
Hamdi’s interrogators, and the names and titles of all government 
officials who had a role in classifying Hamdi as an enemy combatant—
for in camera review.20 The government appealed a second time, and 
once again, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, directing it now 
to dismiss the habeas petition on the ground that it was “undisputed that 
Hamdi [had been] captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign 
theater of conflict.”21 
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the Fourth Circuit in a 
fractured vote.22 Justice O’Connor led a plurality of four in concluding 
that the AUMF provided the President with standard wartime tools, 
including military detention of captured lawful combatants.23 Although 
the AUMF was titled a “joint resolution,” it was bicameral legislation 
signed into law by the President and therefore constituted a statute.24 As 
such, Justice O’Connor argued that the AUMF suspended the Non-
Detention Act, thus allowing non-criminal detention of American 
citizens falling within its scope.25 While Hamdi’s status as an American 
citizen did not protect him from being placed into military detention, it 
did guarantee him a degree of procedural due process, such as a hearing 
before a neutral decision maker (though not necessarily a federal 
judge)26 and counsel to assist in challenging his enemy combatant 
designation in that hearing.27 
In a separate opinion, Justice Thomas provided a fifth vote for the 
detention power, although he labeled his opinion a dissent because he 
believed that the AUMF granted the President far more authority than 
the plurality suggested.28 In addition, Justice Thomas mused that the 
296 F.3d 278, 279, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).  
20. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512-14. 
21. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003). 
22. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
23. Id. at 518. 
24. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 (1983). 
25. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517. 
26. Id. at 533 (right to notice of allegations and hearing before neutral decision maker). 
27. Id. at 539 (right to counsel).
28. Id. at 589 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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President’s role as Commander-in-Chief may provide constitutional 
authority to detain anyone, even an American citizen, that he deemed an 
enemy combatant, although ultimately he (Justice Thomas) did not 
resolve that issue.29 
Justice Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg) argued that the language 
of the Non-Detention Act, as well as the historical context of its 
passage,30 obligated Congress to provide a clear statement of its 
suspension in any subsequent legislation and that the AUMF failed to 
provide such a clear statement.31 To be clear, Justice Souter did not 
argue that Congress could not authorize the President to detain American 
citizens captured on the battlefield, merely that Congress had not done 
so in this instance.32 Recognizing, however, that there were five votes to 
sustain the President’s detention authority, but only four votes on the 
issue of due process, Justice Souter joined the plurality’s judgment to 
remand the matter to the district court.33 
In contrast, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Stevens) challenged the 
President’s authority to detain an American citizen allegedly captured 
while fighting on the battlefield against American troops, without 
criminal charges, even pursuant to an AUMF.34 A key precedent that he 
relied upon was the post-Civil War decision Ex parte Milligan, in which 
the Supreme Court reversed a military conviction of a civilian in Indiana 
for inciting insurrection against the Union and providing assistance to 
the Confederacy.35 The constitutional defect with the military trial, the 
Court explained, was that “in Indiana the Federal authority was always 
unopposed, and its court is always open to hear criminal accusations and 
redress grievances; and no usage of war could sanction a military trial 
there for any offe[n]ce whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise 
connected with the military service.”36 From Milligan, Justice Scalia 
drew the conclusion that “if the law of war cannot be applied to citizens 
where courts are open, then Hamdi’s imprisonment without criminal trial 
29. Id. at 587. 
30. Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment). Although not enacted until 1971, and intended specifically to overrule the Emergency 
Detention Act of 1950, the Non-Detention Act was also a response to the World War II internment 
of over 70,000 Japanese-American citizens. See id.  
31. Id. at 542-45. 
32. Id.
33. Id. at 553 (explaining “the need to give practical effect to the conclusions of eight
Members of the Court rejecting the Government’s position”). 
34. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 567 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6 (1866)).
36. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22. 
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is no less unlawful than Milligan’s trial by military tribunal.”37 
The lessons from Milligan and the Civil War were, according to 
Justice Scalia, that the government had two options available to it in 
terms of dealing with a citizen like Hamdi: (1) it could prosecute them in 
civilian court for treason or related crimes; or (2) it could seek 
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which would 
then enable it to detain the citizen without judicial interference.38 To be 
fair, Justice Scalia recognized that his approach would create challenges 
for the government in dealing with American citizens who purportedly 
fight for the enemy: “I frankly do not know whether these tools are 
sufficient to meet the Government’s security needs, including the need 
to obtain intelligence through interrogation. It is far beyond my 
competence, or the Court’s competence, to determine that. But it is not 
beyond Congress’s.”39 
What is important to note is that Justice Scalia conceded that 
Congress was institutionally competent to determine whether the tools in 
question (prosecution for treason or suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus) were adequate for the President’s needs.40 However, he did not 
concede that Congress had any superior competence in crafting 
additional tools: “If the situation demands it, the Executive can ask 
Congress to authorize suspension of the writ—which can be made 
subject to whatever conditions Congress deems appropriate, including 
even the procedural novelties invented by the plurality today.”41 
III. WHAT’S WRONG WITH JUSTICE SCALIA’S PROPOSALS?
Having examined the background of and the opinions in Hamdi, we 
can now turn to evaluating Justice Scalia’s supposedly civil libertarian-
friendly proposal for the President to charge Hamdi with a federal crime, 
to seek congressional suspension of habeas corpus, or to release Hamdi. 
A. Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: Blunt Force Trauma
The fallback tool for the Executive Branch, according to Justice
Scalia, was suspension of the privilege of petitioning for a writ of habeas 
corpus.42 Consistent with the individual views expressed by two former 
37. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 567-68. 
38. Id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 577-78. 
40. Id.
41. Id. at 578.
42. Id. at 561-63 (Scalia, J, dissenting). 
7
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Chief Justices, Justice Scalia viewed the suspension power as belonging 
to Congress, not the President.43 Therefore, under this view, the 
President would not have unilateral power to detain American citizens. It 
is true that a requirement to suspend the writ would force the Executive 
Branch to involve Congress, and thus from a separation of powers 
perspective, would provide a measure of checks and balances.44 
However, as Dean Trevor Morrison observed a decade ago, “the 
suspension-as-authorization model could, if adopted more broadly, pose 
a serious threat to the safeguards of liberty built into the law of habeas 
corpus and the Constitution itself.”45 One can ask what a citizen would 
most expect his civil rights to do for him when he is being detained as an 
enemy combatant; the answer presumably would be that due process 
rights are treasured in such a circumstance primarily because they are 
the vehicle for challenging one’s detention, especially if the citizen 
believes he has been classified incorrectly as a combatant.46 The 
traditional notion of due process includes notice, an opportunity to 
challenge the governmental action, a hearing before a neutral decision 
maker, assistance of counsel, a right to present evidence and to challenge 
the evidence against oneself, and more.47 
At this point, it will be useful to consider the Bush Administration’s 
response to the Guantanamo Bay litigation that culminated in Rasul v. 
Bush.48 The Rasul plaintiffs were suspected al Qaeda or Taliban fighters 
captured in Afghanistan who were brought to the U.S. naval base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for detention.49 They sought to challenge their 
detention via petitions for writs of habeas corpus.50 Accordingly, these 
detainees were facing the same indefinite detention that Hamdi was 
facing. 
The Bush Administration argued that federal courts lacked 
43. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 101 (1807); see also Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas.
144, 151-52 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
44. See Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension As Authorization?, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 411, 416 (2006). 
45. See id. 
46. Cf. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having 
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the 
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”). 
47. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-95 
(1975). 
48. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
49. Id. at 466.
50. Id.
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jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions because the detainees were non-
citizens outside U.S. territory.51 In support of this argument, the 
government pointed to a post-World War II precedent, Johnson v. 
Eisentrager,52 in which the Supreme Court rejected habeas petitions 
filed by German prisoners who were convicted of war crimes for 
continuing to attack American forces after Germany had surrendered 
because they were outside the jurisdiction of federal courts.53 
Eisentrager’s exact holding is a bit unclear, as Justice Jackson discussed 
competing rationales for ruling against the defendants without specifying 
which rationale carried the day.54 
On the one hand, Eisentrager can be understood as a 
straightforward interpretation about the meaning of the federal habeas 
corpus statute, concluding that Congress had not intended for federal 
judges to be able to authorize habeas writs against custodians not located 
in any United States federal district.55 Under this interpretation, at any 
time it wanted to do so, Congress could amend the habeas statute so as 
to give persons detained by U.S. forces outside the United States the 
right to seek habeas review of their detention. On the other hand, 
Eisentrager could be read more broadly as a decision holding that 
federal courts are disabled under constitutional principles from 
entertaining any claims by enemy aliens during times of war.56 Either 
way, what is clear is that the defendants in Eisentrager lost their case, 
not because the Court concluded that their convictions were valid, but 
rather because they had no right to be heard at all. 
Eisentrager seemed like a strong precedent for the government in 
Rasul; like the German prison in Eisentrager, the entire space at 
Guantanamo Bay had long been considered outside U.S. territory. 
During the 1990s, the Clinton Administration routinely diverted to the 
base those Haitian refugees who were interdicted from U.S. territory. 
The refugees were held there until they could be sent back to Haiti, and 
lower federal courts repeatedly dismissed habeas petitions filed on 
behalf of the refugees based on Eisentrager.57 No doubt relying in part 
51. Id. at 475-76. 
52. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
53. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76. For more on Eisentrager’s relevance to Rasul, see Tung Yin,
The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1061, 1070-
72 (2005). 
54. Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine Enemy Combatant Status in the War on 
Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 374 (2005). 
55. See id. 
56. See id. 
57. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995); see also
9
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on the Haitian refugee precedents, the Bush Administration selected 
Guantanamo Bay as the detention site for the supposedly more 
dangerous captured fighters. 
However, instead of following Eisentrager and dismissing the 
detainees’ petitions, the Court in Rasul more or less disregarded the 
earlier case and held that the detainees could proceed with their habeas 
petitions in federal court.58 The Court could have predicated its ruling on 
a conclusion that Guantanamo Bay was effectively U.S. territory based 
on the unusual terms of the lease between Cuba and the United States,59 
but after considering this approach, the Court eschewed it.60 Instead, the 
Court resolved the statutory jurisdictional issue by noting that the lower 
federal court could issue the habeas writ against the Secretary of 
Defense, who would have the authority to order the commander of the 
military base to release any detainees who successfully challenged the 
grounds for detention.61 
Notably, Justice Scalia agreed with the government’s argument in 
Rasul.62 The first important observation that follows from the 
juxtaposition of Justice Scalia’s votes in Hamdi and Rasul is that his 
concern for Yaser Hamdi’s right to be free from military detention was 
uniquely based on Hamdi’s status as an American citizen, not any 
objection to military detention itself, as that was the only difference 
between Hamdi and the hundreds of other men captured in Afghanistan 
and transported to Guantanamo Bay. 
The second important observation is that Justice Scalia’s view of 
the proper disposition of Rasul is exactly what suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus would look like for the citizen-detainee. Prior to the 
decision in Rasul, the only due process that the detainees received to 
determine their combatant status was an initial screening by teams 
consisting of a mixture of Justice Department lawyers, Central 
Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513–15 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Bird v. 
United States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 340–42 (D. Conn. 1996). 
58. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475-79 (2004). 
59. Id. at 480-83. 
60. Id. at 483-84. Justice Kennedy would have decided the case under the “Guantanamo Bay
is in every practical respect a United States territory” theory. Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
61. The Court did not satisfactorily explain why this argument would not have applied to the
Defense Secretary in Eisentrager, other than to suggest that Eisentrager had been effectively 
overruled by a later case that undercut one of Eisentrager’s precedents. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-
79 (majority opinion). 
62. Id. at 497-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today, the Court springs a trap on the Executive,
subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of the federal courts even though it has never before 
been thought to be within their jurisdiction—and thus making it a foolish place to have housed alien 
wartime detainees.”). 
10
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Intelligence Agency agents, and military personnel.63 As I noted shortly 
after the decision was issued: 
The detainees selected to be sent to Guantanamo Bay had no legal 
counsel, no apparent right to contest the evidence against them, and no 
apparent right to call witnesses or present evidence. The persons 
making the decision to send an individual to Guantanamo Bay may 
have been involved in the capture itself.64 
Critics of the detention facility called it a “law-free zone” and argued 
that the United States was “creat[ing] a culture of disrespect for the 
law.”65 
To be sure, this kind of rudimentary screening process may have 
been all that was possible in the early days of the war in Afghanistan.66 
After Rasul was decided, however, the Defense Department established 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to provide a more formal 
process for ascertaining each detainee’s combatant status.67 In 
preparation for the CSRTs, each detainee was assigned a military officer 
as a “personal representative” (but not as legal counsel).68 The decision 
makers at the CSRTs were “three neutral commissioned officers.”69 The 
detainee was permitted to call “reasonably available” witnesses, and had 
the right to testify at the hearing or not to testify.70 
The announcement of the CSRTs could be seen as a direct response 
to Rasul and an implicit admission that the previous informal procedures 
would not withstand judicial scrutiny once lower federal courts began to 
entertain habeas petitions. Moreover, the CSRTs were subsequently 
supplemented with annual Administrative Review Hearings (ARHs), in 
which military personnel re-evaluated whether each detainee remained 
subject to continued detention.71 The difference between CSRTs and 
ARHs is that the former was concerned with verifying a detainee’s status 
63. See Yin, supra note 53, at 1099 n.255 (citing source for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
description of the screening process). 
64. Id. (citing Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s briefing).
65. See, e.g., Thomas B. Wilner, Law-Free Zone, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2004, at A12. 
66. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972) (upholding preliminary screening
procedure for seizing property under writ of replevin, so long as there were more rigorous 
procedures afterward). 
67. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy,
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) (on file with author).  
68. Id. at para. c. 
69. Id. at para. e.
70. Id. at para. g(8), (10), (11). 
71. See Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal
Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 149, 208-09 (2005). 
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as a combatant—anyone who was found to be a non-combatant was 
subject to release—while the latter was concerned with whether a given 
combatant-detainee would still pose a threat to U.S. forces if released. 
The ARHs were the formal mechanism through which the vast majority 
of the Guantanamo detainee population was gradually reduced from a 
peak of nearly 1,000 to under 100 as President Obama entered his last 
year in office. 
Even if one believed that the CSRTs and ARHs fell short of what 
should have been provided to the detainees (either as a matter of law or 
policy), they embodied more process than what preceded them. Perhaps 
the Bush Administration would have implemented them even had it 
prevailed in Rasul. In that situation, however, such procedures would 
have been a matter of executive grace, unilaterally revocable at any time. 
1. Appointed Counsel and Suspension of Habeas Corpus
Now we can compare the procedural rights (or privileges,
depending on the scenario) that detainees in a habeas-free environment 
receive, compared to what the Court actually provided Hamdi. Because 
Hamdi was already subjected to the informal screening in Afghanistan, 
we can assume that to be the minimum process that would be available 
no matter what. 
In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court concisely explained the 
myriad benefits that counsel provide a criminal defendant: 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no 
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, gen-
erally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or 
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of 
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted 
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or oth-
erwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately 
to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against 
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of convic-
tion because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that 
be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant 
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.72 
The value added by counsel in the situation where an individual is 
challenging his detention by the state can be seen by comparing the 
72. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
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success rates of habeas petitions filed by convicted felons represented by 
counsel (12.6 percent, according to one study in 1979) versus those 
representing themselves (0.9 percent, according to the same study).73 A 
citizen detained as an enemy combatant is not, strictly speaking, a 
criminal defendant because military detention is not criminal 
prosecution.74 However, the harm to the wrongly detained individual is 
the same: erroneous deprivation of liberty. 
To be sure, the nature of the issues to be resolved in a criminal trial 
are generally more complicated than those in a combatant status 
determination procedure (whether informal, CSRT, or Hamdi-type 
hearing). The criminal trial encompasses not only factual questions 
(whether the admissible evidence proves that the defendant committed 
the acts specified in the elements of the crime), but also legal ones 
(whether the investigation comported with the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments and other applicable criminal procedure rules, whether the 
criminal law proscribes constitutionally protected conduct, and so on). 
Combatant status determination, on the other hand, is primarily a factual 
question of whether the detainee was a combatant subject to lawful 
attack on the battlefield, or a non-combatant entitled to be free from 
targeted attack.75 Some parts of Powell’s recitation of the value of 
counsel relate entirely to legal issues, and thus have limited relevance to 
the citizen-detainee scenario. However, when it comes to the goal of 
persuading the decision maker that one was not a combatant, even if the 
factual question is one that does not involve legal research, synthesis, or 
analysis, an attorney would still be able to provide a “guiding hand” in 
the presentation.76 
When it comes to the assistance of counsel, the suspension-like 
environment of Guantanamo pre-Rasul (and even that of post-Rasul, 
over Justice Scalia’s dissent) falls well short of providing anything 
comparable to that which Hamdi required. By the time the case reached 
the Supreme Court, the Bush Administration had already relented and 
permitted Federal Public Defender Frank Dunham to represent Hamdi 
by appointment.77 By contrast, the CSRTs—which may have been 
73. PAUL H. ROBINSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE COURT JUDGMENTS 58 (1979). 
74. See Yin, supra note 71, at 163-73 (explaining that military detainees who commit
violations of the laws of war can and sometimes do face war crimes trials, which do seek to impose 
punishment upon those successfully convicted).  
75. See Yin, supra note 53, at 1084-85. 
76. See Yin, supra note 53, at 1108-14. 
77. See, e.g., Frank Dunham Jr., 64, Who Argued Terror Cases, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2006, at A19; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (“He unquestionably has the right to 
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adopted only because of the decision in Rasul—did not provide 
appointed counsel for Guantanamo detainees. Each detainee was 
assigned a military officer as a “personal representative,” but that officer 
was neither legal counsel nor even an advocate of any kind.78 Rather, the 
personal representative’s purpose was to provide logistical assistance. 
At least the detainees had personal representatives to assist, in 
however limited a fashion, at the CSRTs. As described by then-Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld, the informal screening process in Afghanistan most 
resembled police interrogation with neither Miranda warnings nor 
counsel. The detainees were questioned by their captors, with no one 
representing their interests, arguing on their behalf, or even pointing out 
that certain answers to some questions would qualify as admissions to 
hostile combatant status. This is not to say that Miranda warnings were 
legally required in Afghanistan, at least with regard to non-U.S. 
persons.79 Given the circumstances of ongoing hostilities, the fog of war, 
the need for security, and the absence of lawyers with security 
clearances, it would have been infeasible to treat the military detainees 
as criminal suspects. 
The important point is that, as a result of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the eponymous case, Yaser Hamdi was in a much better 
position to fight an erroneous classification than the similarly-situated 
Guantanamo detainees were. Had the government opted to seek 
suspension of habeas corpus, Hamdi would have been left to languish in 
the naval brig for however long suspension lasted, with no assistance of 
counsel and no hearings to challenge his detention. 
2. Is Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus Realistic?
Since the beginning days of the long war against al Qaeda, there
access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on remand.”). 
78. See Wolfowitz, supra note 67, at para. c.
79. Note that there was an internal legal struggle within the Justice Department over whether
FBI agents could interrogate the other American citizen-detainee captured in Afghanistan, John 
Walker Lindh, while he was still in military custody and without legal representation. A Justice 
Department lawyer named Jessalyn Raddack opined that the better course of action was to inform 
Lindh that his father had retained a lawyer for him and to seek Lindh’s waiver of counsel. For a 
summary of Raddack’s involvement in the Lindh interrogation, see David McGowan, Politics, 
Office Politics, and Legal Ethics: A Case Study in the Strategy of Judgment, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1057, 1060-67 (2007). Instead, the FBI agents in the field did not tell Lindh about the 
retained lawyer. Id. at 1060. Raddack later secretly disclosed her written legal analysis to a 
journalist, triggering a leak investigation that resulted in a government complaint against her to the 
Maryland and District of Columbia bars. Id. at 1060-71. By that time, she had left the government 
and was working for a private law firm. Id. 
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have been only a small number of American citizens subject to military 
detention: just Hamdi and Jose Padilla, who was arrested as he got off a 
plane at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport.80 A third man, Ali al-
Marri, who was not a citizen but was lawfully admitted to the United 
States as a resident, also spent a number of years in military detention.81 
Even if we include al-Marri in the group of military detainees Justice 
Scalia’s Hamdi dissent addresses, there would have been a grand total of 
three suspected enemy combatants for whom the government would 
need to seek suspension of habeas in order to justify their continued 
detention. 
Suspension of habeas is, as one might suspect, a fairly drastic step. 
As Daniel Farber has explained, because of the requirement of invasion 
or insurrection that threatens public safety, “by definition, we are dealing 
with dire emergencies.”82 The day of September 11, 2001 (particularly 
in the morning, as the attacks were unfolding) and even the next few 
days likely qualified as a dire emergency, especially given the fear of 
follow-up attacks.83 By 2004, however, when Hamdi was decided, it 
would be hard to argue plausibly that the country was in a state of dire 
emergency. 
Moreover, if the privilege of petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus 
had been suspended in its entirety, the impact would have been felt by 
far more than Hamdi, Padilla, and al-Marri: any person in official 
custody in the United States, such as federal as well as state prisoners, 
would lose the ability to challenge his or her detention in post-conviction 
proceedings in federal court. While only a fraction of the approximately 
1.5 million prisoners in the United States might be eligible to seek 
federal habeas review at any given time, that fraction would dwarf the 
80. Padilla’s case was legally similar to Hamdi’s in many regards, as both individuals were
American citizens detained as enemy combatants in naval brigs on U.S. soil, but if anything, Padilla 
had an even stronger claim against such detention, given that he was captured at an American 
airport where there were no active hostilities. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004). 
81. Like Hamdi and Padilla, al-Marri litigated the lawfulness of his detention as an enemy
combatant. After several back-and-forth trips between a district court and the Fourth Circuit, see al-
Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 
U.S. 1220 (2009), the government transferred al-Marri out of military detention into civilian courts 
and prosecuted him for a variety of federal crimes that were largely unrelated to the original basis 
for detaining him. See al-Marri v. Davis, 714 F.3d 1183, 1185 (10th Cir. 2013). 
82. DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 191 (2003). 
83. See, e.g., Tung Yin, The Impact of the 9/11 Attacks on National Security Law Casebooks, 
19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 157, 159 (2006) (noting that apart from the thousands of deaths and 
casualties, the 9/11 attacks led to a four-day closure of the stock market and the grounding of all 
flights for two days). 
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three enemy combatants in numerical terms.84 In its basic form, the 
suspension solution would require the government to cut off the only 
federal court review of thousands of state prisoners just to deny court 
review of the military detention of three men. 
To the extent suspension of habeas was meant seriously as a course 
of action, perhaps Justice Scalia meant that it would be done selectively 
for only American enemy combatants. One could look at historic 
examples of the imposition of martial law by the federal government, 
some of which affected only specific parts of the country. For example, 
Andrew Jackson (as a United States General) suspended all civil rights 
in New Orleans in late 1814 in advance of the Battle of New Orleans, 
but the rest of the country was unaffected.85 Similarly, then-territory of 
Hawaii found itself under martial law immediately after the Japanese 
sneak attack on Pearl Harbor; the threat of invasion of the West Coast 
prompted the infamous military orders that ultimately led to the forced 
relocation and detention of over 70,000 Japanese-Americans (and 40,000 
Japanese aliens) away from California, Oregon, and Washington.86 
To be sure, there are some limitations to the use of martial law as 
an analogy to habeas suspension. Most importantly, martial law was 
imposed in areas that were believed to be in danger of being invaded and 
thus potentially subject to loss of government control. In that event, 
there might no longer be courts available to adjudicate civil rights claims 
or police to enforce laws. The power to suspend habeas corpus includes 
the limitation that it be used only “when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”87 When President Lincoln 
took it upon himself to suspend habeas corpus during the Civil War, he 
subsequently justified his action on the grounds of immediacy, stating to 
Congress in his famous “all the laws but one” speech: 
84. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ NO. 248955, 
PRISONERS IN 2014 (2015) (noting that in 2014, there were 1.56 million state and federal prisoners 
in custody). Over the past sixty years, federal habeas corpus has spawned an increasing number of 
procedural rules and requirements that have made it increasingly easy for courts to dispose of 
habeas petitions without reaching the merits: (1) those raising claims that weren’t presented to the 
state courts are often deemed procedurally defaulted; (2) those raising claims that were raised in 
previous habeas petitions are often rejected as successive petitions; and (3) those raising claims 
based on “new” rules (i.e., intervening Supreme Court decisions) frequently lose because such new 
rules are not cognizable on habeas. See generally ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY H.K. DALEY, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ NO. 155504, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE 
COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 2, 18-19 (1995).   
85. See, e.g., MATTHEW WARSHAUER, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE POLITICS OF MARTIAL 
LAW 320 (2006). 
86. See, e.g., Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 285-87 (1944). 
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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It was decided that we have a case of rebellion and that the public safe-
ty does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ 
which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and 
not the Executive, is vested with this power; but the Constitution itself 
is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provi-
sion was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it can not be be-
lieved the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the 
danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, 
the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in 
this case, by the rebellion.88 
Criticism of Lincoln’s actions focused on the fact that he had acted 
unilaterally rather than seeking suspension ahead of time from Congress, 
given that the Suspension Clause resided in Article I of the Constitution, 
not Article II. Lincoln himself agreed that rebellion or invasion was a 
necessary prerequisite but one that was obviously satisfied by the 
secession of the Southern states. It was necessary for him to suspend 
habeas without waiting for Congress to act because Congress was in 
recess at the time, and the fear was that by the time Congress could be 
hailed back into session, the conditions would have deteriorated perhaps 
irreversibly.89 
Suspension of habeas, even on a limited basis (as applied to 
American enemy combatants), would seemingly require some showing 
that there was rebellion or invasion, if not nationally, at least localized in 
the area where the would-be petitioners were detained. Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that it was an open question “whether the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, constitute an ‘invasion,’ and whether those attacks 
still justify suspension several years later,” but argued that it was “for 
Congress rather than this Court” to answer.90 This is an entirely 
defensible position and one that is consistent with Justice Scalia’s 
general approach of interpreting the Constitution strictly based on the 
text (and specifically, the original meaning of the words in the text), 
given the language of the Suspension Clause. 
However, it is also one that is arguably inimical to the rights of 
disfavored individuals. Because they are political branches, Congress 
and the White House are more sensitive to majoritarian pressures 
compared to federal courts. The very reason federal judges were given 
88. See President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress, (July 4, 1861), available at 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3508. 
89. Id. This point is captured in the well-known line: “Are all the laws but one to go
unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?” Id. 
90. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 578 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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life tenure was to promote their independence so that they could “be 
considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative 
encroachments.”91 An individual member of Congress might well 
believe that suspension is not warranted and be willing to stand on that 
principle, but in a closely contested district or state, such a member 
might well heed public opinion, especially if the disposition of the 
American detainees becomes a high-profile political issue. 
B. Criminal Prosecution: Slash and Burn
The other tool available to the government, in Justice Scalia’s view,
was traditional criminal prosecution.92 The praise that Justice Scalia’s 
Hamdi dissent has received from human rights advocates and civil 
libertarians likely stems in part from the fact that members of those 
groups had consistently argued that military detainees (including the 
hundreds at Guantanamo Bay) should have been charged with crimes in 
civilian courts or released.93 This push to transfer all detainees, whether 
citizens or aliens, out of the military detention system and into the 
civilian criminal justice system—i.e., to charge them with federal crimes 
and to prosecute them in federal courts—continued throughout President 
Bush’s second term and well into President Obama’s first term. 
It is easy to see why the civilian criminal justice system would 
appear to be a preferred venue over indefinite military detention. A 
federal criminal defendant is entitled to a panoply of important rights set 
forth in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, as well as in 
various federal statutes. A defendant may seek exclusion of 
incriminating evidence on the ground that it was found in violation of 
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.94 The 
defendant is presumed innocent and is entitled to acquittal unless the 
government can prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“Nor need we enquire . . . whether prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
92. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 560-61. 
93. This is not to say that Justice Scalia completely agreed with the human rights advocates
and civil libertarians. As discussed earlier, in Rasul v. Bush, decided the same day as Hamdi, Justice 
Scalia argued that alien fighters captured in Afghanistan in circumstances similar to those of Hamdi 
were entitled to no judicial process. Justice Scalia based his argument for prosecution of Hamdi 
solely on Hamdi’s status as an American citizen. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 502-06 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
94. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961). 
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doubt.95 The defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel, including 
appointment of counsel by the court if indigent.96 
Eric Holder, who was President Obama’s first Attorney General, 
perceived federal criminal trials as offering more legitimacy than 
military commissions, which was why he fought to transfer suspected 
9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) from the custody of 
the Department of Defense so that he could be prosecuted in the 
Southern District of New York.97 Holder argued that federal courts had 
already presided successfully over a number of terrorism prosecutions 
and would therefore be able to oversee civilian prosecutions of KSM and 
other high-level al Qaeda detainees. The advantage of using an Article 
III court as opposed to a military commission would have been to 
highlight the civil rights that the United States provides to criminal 
defendants, even those accused of atrocities as heinous as the 9/11 
attacks. 
This perception of federal courts as the gold standard ties in nicely 
with Justice Scalia’s argument that a citizen such as Hamdi should be 
prosecuted. Delving deeper into the suggestion of prosecuting Hamdi 
leads one to ask, for what crime or crimes? Justice Scalia tossed out ten 
federal criminal statutes in one paragraph as possibilities, including 
treason,98 use of weapons of mass destruction,99 providing material 
support to terrorists or to designated foreign terrorist organizations,100 
and seditious conspiracy,101 among others.102 With that variety of 
possible charges, one would expect that there would be something on the 
list that could be used to prosecute Yaser Hamdi. As Justice Scalia 
pointed out, another American citizen (John Walker Lindh) captured in 
Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban was prosecuted in an Article III 
court.103 After being charged in a ten-count indictment,104 Lindh pleaded 
95. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
96. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). 
97. See Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Opposition to U.S. Trial Likely to Keep Mastermind
of 9/11 Attacks in Detention, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/12/AR2010111207508.html (“Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the self-
proclaimed mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, will probably remain in military detention 
without trial for the foreseeable future, according to Obama administration officials.”). 
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012) 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2012). 
100. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012). 
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2012). 
102. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 560-61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 561. 
104. See Indictment as to John Phillip Walker Lindh, United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d
565 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. CR. 02-37-A), https://www.justice.gov/ag/united-states-district-court-
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guilty to supplying services to the Taliban and carrying an explosive 
during the commission of a felony, and received a twenty-year prison 
sentence.105 
Lindh’s case indeed provides a useful example to study, but 
ultimately it fails to support Justice Scalia’s argument because of a key 
difference between Lindh and Hamdi. Like Hamdi, Lindh was an 
American citizen by virtue of having been born on U.S. soil, and, like 
Hamdi, Lindh was captured by Northern Alliance forces after the United 
States began attacking Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan. In 
between those pairs of events, however, their lives were very different. 
Lindh was born in Washington, D.C. For the first seventeen years 
of his life, he lived in Maryland and then northern California. At 
seventeen, he decided on his own to spend just under a year in Yemen, 
returning to the United States for a short time, and then moving to 
Pakistan, finally ending up in Afghanistan in early 2001, supposedly to 
join the Taliban in its fight against the Northern Alliance.106 He grew up 
in the United States and when he moved, ultimately to Afghanistan, he 
knew that he was still an American citizen.107 That he recognized his 
status as an American is further demonstrated by the fact that he refused 
to “tak[e] part in operations against the United States . . . .”108 It is also 
reinforced by the fact that Lindh left Yemen and returned to the United 
States because his visa had expired; thus, “home” for him was still the 
United States.109 
In contrast, Hamdi was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to two 
Saudi citizens who moved back to Saudi Arabia “when he was a small 
child.”110 There is no evidence that Hamdi spent any time in the United 
States beyond those early childhood years until he was transferred from 
Guantanamo Bay to Norfolk in 2002. He was an American citizen 
because the Fourteenth Amendment and federal law grant citizenship to 
anyone born on U.S. soil,111 no matter the circumstances of how the 
mother came to be in the country.112 However, he did not grow up in the 
eastern-district-virginia-alexandria-division.  
105. See United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566, 574 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
106. Id. at 567 
107. Id. (“Before leaving the recruiting center, defendant was told by HUM officials not to
disclose his American citizenship to anyone.”). 
108. Id. at 568. 
109. See John Rico, Can John Walker Lindh Go Home Now?, GQ (Feb. 28, 2009),
http://www.gq.com/story/john-walker-lindh-afghanistan-captured-taliban (“John would stay in 
Yemen for nine months, leaving only after his visa expired and he was forced to head home.”). 
110. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012). 
112. See, e.g., Shelby Grad, Asian ‘Anchor Babies’: Wealthy Chinese Come to Southern
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United States, and because he grew up in Saudi Arabia as the child of 
Saudi citizens, he would not have had any identity as an American. If 
Afghanistan had deported him before 9/11, it strains credulity to believe 
that he would have come to the United States instead of returning to 
Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, this difference between Lindh and Hamdi—whether 
there was evidence that each man believed himself to be an American—
does not matter from the standpoint of whether they are entitled to 
constitutional rights, because they both are. Even the plurality opinion in 
Hamdi, from which Justice Scalia dissented, expressly concluded that, as 
a citizen, Hamdi was entitled to due process rights.113 That both are 
entitled to the protection of the Constitution does not, however, mandate 
that they are similarly situated with respect to how they might be treated 
if criminally charged upon capture. 
Consider the first statute that Justice Scalia suggested could apply 
to Hamdi’s conduct: treason. The modern treason statute states: 
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against 
them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within 
the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer 
death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under 
this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding 
any office under the United States.114 
The operative phrase in this statute for the purposes of this 
discussion is “owing allegiance to the United States.” The published 
cases have taken a broad view of that clause, holding that American 
citizens owe allegiance to the United States no matter where they live.115 
Taken at face value, such cases would fully support a treason charge 
based on Hamdi’s alleged conduct of fighting against American forces. 
California to Give Birth, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-asian-anchor-babies-wealthy-chinese-20150826-story.html (“Pregnant women 
travel to the United States, usually on tourist visas, so that their children will be born U.S. 
citizens.”); Miriam Jordan, Where ‘Anchor Babies’ Can Be a Lucrative Business: Wealthy Chinese 
‘Birth Tourists’ on Visas Spend Freely in Southern California, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2015, 3:25 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/where-anchor-babies-can-be-a-lucrative-business-1446668720 
(“Thousands of wealthy foreign women, mostly Chinese, come to America each year for the express 
purpose of having babies on U.S. soil. The women arrive on tourist visas and typically go home 
with the baby after several months.”). 
113. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 524-35 (2004). 
114. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012). 
115. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 (1952); see also Burgman v. United 
States, 188 F.2d 637, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (rejecting the argument that the jury should have been 
instructed that “one situate[d] in a foreign land and deprived of the protections due from the country 
of his citizenship is relieved of all duty of allegiance to the latter country”). 
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After all, given the undisputed fact that Hamdi was born in Louisiana, he 
was an American citizen, and therefore he owed allegiance to the United 
States. Yet, a closer look at these cases suggests some problems with a 
treason charge against Hamdi. 
In United States v. Fricke, the defendant, during World War I, 
borrowed a sum of money from an American bank on behalf of a 
German agent.116 The district judge submitted to the jury the question: 
“Was what Fricke did, whatever you may find he did, of a character 
which indicated that his mind entertained an evil intent to do that wrong 
to the United States of America which consists in adhering to its 
enemies, giving them aid and comfort?”117 The judge explained that if a 
peaceful German citizen in the United States had asked to borrow money 
to get through hard times, it would not be treasonous to comply, but that 
it would be if the defendant did so after being told by the borrower “I am 
an alien enemy and you know it, and I want you to lend me a thousand 
dollars, or give me a thousand dollars, to do a wrong against the United 
States of America.”118 Similarly, in Burgman v. United States,119 in 
affirming the defendant’s treason conviction for preparing radio reports 
for German broadcasters to air against American troops, the D.C. Circuit 
noted that the district judge had “instructed the jury that an intent to 
betray one’s country is an essential element of the crime of treason and 
must be proved as such.”120 
A treason prosecution that presented the inverse facts to Hamdi’s 
was United States v. Stephan,121 a World War II-era case in which a 
seemingly naturalized citizen argued that he had obtained U.S. 
citizenship fraudulently, “and that as an alien he could not commit the 
crime of treason.”122 In denying the defendant a new trial, the trial court 
concluded that the fraud rendered the citizenship order voidable, not 
void, and that the defendant still owed duties and obligations to the 
United States; after all, fraudulently or not, he had “applied for 
citizenship and took the oath of allegiance voluntarily.”123 
What ties these cases together is the implication that the defendants 
breached an obligation of loyalty by taking actions that they knew were 
antithetical to the United States. In United States v. Fricke, Fricke was 
116. United States v. Fricke, 259 F. 673, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). 
117. Id. at 682. 
118. Id. at 682. 
119. Burgman, 188 F.2d at 642. 
120. Id. at 640.
121. See United States v. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Mich. 1943). 
122. Id. at 447-48. 
123. Id. at 448. 
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living in the United States, so the only issue in that case was whether 
providing funds to an enemy alien during war time would necessarily 
constitute treason; the trial court’s instruction stood for the proposition 
that it would be treasonous behavior only if the defendant knew that the 
enemy alien intended to harm the United States.124 In Burgman v. United 
States, Burgman argued that he had not committed treason because (1) 
he was living in Europe and believed himself no longer to be a citizen of 
the United States, and therefore was relieved of his otherwise known 
obligation to be loyal; and (2) simply preparing radio broadcasts for 
German radio stations was not a disloyal act.125 The trial judge allowed 
Burgman to argue his lack of intent to betray the United States, though 
the jury apparently disagreed.126 Finally, in United States v. Stephan, 
Stephan was legally not an American citizen due to his fraud, but he held 
himself out to be one, and it would be entirely within the realm of reason 
to expect that he knew that helping a German soldier would be an act of 
disloyalty.127 
Was it reasonable to expect that Hamdi would recognize that the 
Taliban had become the enemy of his country? Put another way, was it 
reasonable to expect that Hamdi would recognize that the United States 
was his country? In an earlier article, I have argued that while Hamdi 
was properly accorded due process rights as an American citizen, he was 
properly classified as an enemy combatant rather than a criminal 
defendant, because criminal prosecution would be in effect imposing 
punishment on him for viewing the United States as his enemy when he 
had no actual connection to the country—and hence could not be said to 
have betrayed this country.128 My argument focused on the fact that the 
United States and Canada are virtually the only nations to determine 
citizenship primarily based on location of birth, as opposed to parents’ 
citizenship, thus leading to the anomalous result of someone having 
citizenship from a country in which that person has no meaningful ties. I 
argued that to treat Hamdi as having acted potentially disloyally by 
fighting against American troops could expose American citizens born 
from immigrant parents to similar charges of treason by foreign 
countries in the event of armed conflict with those parents’ original 
nations. 
124. United States v. Fricke, 259 F. 673, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). 
125. Burgman, 188 F.2d at 639. 
126. Id. at 640. 
127. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. at 447.
128. Tung Yin, Enemies of the State: Rational Classification in the War on Terrorism, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 903, 925-26 (2007). 
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To illustrate this point, I used my own background: given the way 
China determines citizenship of its people—through blood ties, rather 
than place of birth—it was entirely possible that China could determine 
me to be its citizen even though I was born in the United States. In the 
event of a hot war between China and the United States, if I were to 
serve in the U.S. military and be captured by China, it would be 
preposterous to argue that I should be subject to a treason prosecution 
simply because China could declare me to be its citizen when I have 
lived my entire life in the United States and feel zero connection to 
China. Likewise, then, prosecuting Hamdi for treason presents an 
equally absurd proposition. 
If we return to the contrast between Hamdi and Lindh, we see that, 
as noted above, there was no reason to believe that Lindh’s national 
identity was anything but American. He held American citizenship, had 
not renounced it, and held citizenship from no other country. By 
remaining with the Taliban even after learning about the 9/11 attacks 
(and the Taliban’s alleged role in harboring al Qaeda), Lindh threw his 
lot in with the entity that was now the enemy of his home country. 
Tellingly, in its sentencing memorandum, the district court noted 
Lindh’s explanation for why he did not leave the Taliban on September 
12, 2001, after learning about the deadly terrorist attacks the day before: 
“According to defendant, he might have been killed had he attempted to 
leave. This rationalization reflects, as the Court stated in the course of 
sentencing, that it appears defendant was willing to give his life for the 
Taliban, but not for his country.”129 
Whatever country or countries Hamdi might have been expected to 
give his life for, it is hard to see what claim the United States would 
have had to be on that list, apart from the fact that we have an 
idiosyncratic method of granting citizenship even to those who might 
have no reason to know or perhaps even want it. 
Finally, Justice Scalia did not mention conspiracy as a possible 
charge to bring against Hamdi, but given the frequency with which 
conspiracy is charged in federal criminal cases,130 it warrants discussion. 
Under 18 U.S.C. Section 371, it is a federal crime to conspire to commit 
an offense against the United States.131 Conspiracy is an appealing 
charge for at least two major reasons. First, it is an inchoate crime 
consisting of simple elements: an agreement between two or more 
129. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 574 (E.D. Va. 2002) (emphasis added). 
130. Judge Learned Hand once observed that conspiracy is the “darling of the modern
prosecutor’s nursery.” Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). 
131. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
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defendants to commit an offense and an overt act in furtherance of that 
agreement.132 Second, conspirators are substantively liable for all crimes 
committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.133 In 
addition to conspiracy, charges under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) share similar advantages for 
prosecutors and could perhaps be added to the indictment.134 
The advantage of conspiracy, therefore, would be that if the 
government could prove that Hamdi had joined a conspiracy with the 
plotters of the 9/11 attack, then Hamdi could be held criminally liable 
for the 9/11 attack.135 The key element of a criminal conspiracy is the 
agreement to commit a federal offense. Could the government have 
made out a case that Hamdi had agreed with the 9/11 planners and 
operatives to carry out attacks against the United States in violation of 
federal statutes? 
French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person charged 
directly with federal crimes connected to 9/11, provides an instructive 
comparison. He faced prosecution for six counts of conspiracy,136 with 
the objects being to commit acts of transnational terrorism,137 aircraft 
piracy,138 aircraft destruction,139 use of weapons of mass destruction,140 
murder of U.S. employees,141 and destruction of property.142 Because 
Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires only “a 
plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged,” the indictment against Moussaoui did 
not specify how the government would have proven his agreement to 
commit those acts.143 Nevertheless, the indictment sheds light on how 
the government would have gone about establishing that essential 
132. See NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 8.20 (2010), http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/
files/WPD/Criminal_Instructions_2016_12.pdf (last updated Dec. 2016).  
133. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946). 
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012). 
135. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645 (1946) (holding all conspirators 
substantively liable for all criminal actions committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of the 
object of the conspiracy). 
136. See Indictment as to Zacarias Moussaoui, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d
480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. CR. 01-455-A), https://www.justice.gov/ag/indictment-zacarias-
moussaoui.  
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(2), (c) (2012). 
138. 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (2012).
139. 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a)(7), 34 (2012). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (2012). 
141. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117 (2012). 
142. 18 U.S.C. § 844(f), (i), (n) (2012). 
143. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7. 
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element of the conspiracy offenses. 
Because Moussaoui pleaded guilty in the middle of the trial, we 
cannot know whether the jury would have accepted the government’s 
theory.144 However, if we take the indictment as indicative of what the 
prosecutors believed they could prove beyond a reasonable doubt (or at a 
minimum, what they felt they had probable cause to believe),145 we can 
surmise that the government intended to prove through circumstantial 
evidence that Moussaoui was a member of al Qaeda and that he intended 
to take part in either the 9/11 attacks or some similar follow-up event. 
The first twelve paragraphs of count one of the Moussaoui indictment 
focused on the terrorist group al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks.146 There 
were 112 overt acts alleged, of which only nineteen involved Moussaoui. 
What those nineteen overt acts intended to demonstrate was that 
Moussaoui came to the United States and immediately took actions such 
as training at the al Qaeda terrorist camp, taking flight lessons in the 
United States, joining a gym, and buying knives. Although there is 
nothing inherently illegal about any of those steps, their exact similarity 
to actions taken by the actual nineteen hijackers suggests that Moussaoui 
may also have been preparing for a suicide-hijacking mission—and if so, 
that he must have agreed with the 9/11 planners to commit the specified 
unlawful acts. 
Hamdi, however, was at least a further step removed from the 9/11 
attacks than Moussaoui was. The government’s consistent contention 
was that Hamdi was a member of the Taliban, not al Qaeda. While both 
were seen as adversaries of the United States in the days after 9/11, and 
while the Taliban did shelter al Qaeda in Afghanistan, the top level 
Taliban leadership had been divided over whether al Qaeda’s declaration 
of war against the United States was advisable or even justified.147 Of 
course, accurate determination of whether the Taliban leaders agreed to 
help carry out the 9/11 attacks or at least had advance knowledge of 
them is likely to elude us, short of capturing and interrogating those 
144. See United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2010). 
145. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (holding that the Due Process
Clause requires prosecutors to have at least probable cause in order to seek an indictment). 
146. Count one contained all of the operative allegations against Moussaoui; the other five
counts incorporated those allegations by reference. Indictment as to Zacarias Moussaoui, United 
States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. CR. 01-455-A), 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/indictment-zacarias-moussaoui.  
147. See LAWRENCE H. WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER 287, 331 (2006) (“Bin Laden’s 
declaration of war against the United States had split the Taliban. There were those who said that 
America had always been Afghanistan’s friend, so why turn it into a powerful and unnecessary 
enemy?”). 
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persons. The exhaustive 9/11 Commission Report, for example, 
provided much historical background on al Qaeda’s rise up through the 
9/11 attacks, but had little to say about the Taliban’s culpability.148 
Thus, one would need to infer that (1) the Taliban leadership had 
agreed to take part in the 9/11 attacks, and (2) by joining the Taliban, 
Hamdi agreed to all anti-American plots that the Taliban agreed to, even 
if Hamdi had no inkling himself about any of those plots. Under this 
theory, had the government been able to capture or extradite al Qaeda or 
Taliban leaders to stand trial for their roles in the 9/11 attacks, Hamdi 
could have been seated at a very long table with Osama bin Laden, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Mullah Omar, and 
others. For an example of this kind of massive trial consisting of many 
defendants with varying degrees of culpability and connection to the 
various crimes making up a criminal enterprise under the RICO statute, 
see United States v. Castellano.149 Professor Lynch notes in that case: 
While the range of activities charged against the enterprise was vast, 
the involvement of many of the defendants in those activities could on-
ly be described as tangential. For example, one defendant was a juror 
who allegedly took a bribe to fix a prosecution of one of the members 
of the “crew”; another’s entire involvement (limited to three of the 
eighty racketeering acts charged in the indictment) consisted of hiring 
members of the crew to bribe and ultimately to murder a witness 
against his son in a state prosecution entirely unrelated to the affairs of 
the enterprise; others were involved only in one of the many criminal 
affairs of the enterprise, and not at all in its more violent activities. All 
of these defendants were to be tried together, despite the fact that little 
of the evidence in what could only be an extraordinarily lengthy trial 
would have any direct bearing on their own actions. Moreover, the 
government’s proof would not be limited to the actions of the defend-
ants on trial.150 
Such a set-up would potentially prejudice Hamdi unfairly by 
forcing him to sit through a trial associating him with the alleged 
perpetrators of the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil, with only a tiny 
fraction of the trial devoted to presenting inculpatory evidence against 
him—in the form of his having joined the Taliban as a foot soldier. To 
148. In one part, the 9/11 Commission noted that National Security Advisor Sandy Berger
received an intelligence report “quot[ing] Bin Ladin as saying that Mullah Omar had given him a 
completely free hand to act in any country . . . .” 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 13, at 123. 
149. United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
150. Gerard E. Lynch, Rico: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 920, 929-30 (1987). 
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be sure, this sort of prejudice is not unknown, which is why Rule 14 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a defendant to seek 
relief from prejudicial joinder by moving for severance.151 However, 
Rule 14 would have been unlikely to help Hamdi in this hypothetical 
trial because the potential prejudice would accrue due to not only being 
tried in conjunction with seemingly far more culpable co-defendants, 
which could be addressed by severance, but also the conspiracy charge 
itself, for which there is no severance remedy available. 
Accordingly, while there might have been superficial appeal to the 
idea of bringing criminal charges against Hamdi and giving him “a day 
in court,” such charges would be problematic: treason would impose a 
duty of loyalty upon someone who likely has no conscious memories of 
being in the United States and whose parents were never Americans, and 
conspiracy would require stretching the definition of the agreement 
element broadly in a way that would spread into ordinary criminal cases 
and change conspiracy from being the “darling of the prosecutor’s 
nursey” into something like the prosecutor’s goddess.152 
C. The Other Way to Solve the Problem: Death from the Skies
How might the government have responded had Justice Scalia
prevailed in his view? Presumably, it would have attempted to pursue 
the suggested options of suspension or prosecution. However, it is worth 
considering what might have happened had the government found itself 
unable to obtain habeas suspension and unable to bring criminal charges, 
and simply forced to release Hamdi. 
One possibility is that Hamdi would have returned to Saudi Arabia 
and had nothing more to do with al Qaeda, the Taliban, or the United 
States. In that instance, release would have achieved the best possible 
outcome for Hamdi as well as the United States (as there would be no 
more need to spend resources criminally trying or detaining him).153 
Another possibility is that he would have rejoined the Taliban and 
taken part in insurgent attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces in 
Afghanistan.154 Presumably, Hamdi’s presence in a group of armed 
151. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. 
152. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
153. It should be acknowledged that there have been no reports of Hamdi’s having broken the 
terms of his negotiated repatriation to Saudi Arabia in late 2004. 
154. Even as early as 2004, there were reports of released detainees who had re-entered 
combat against the United States in Afghanistan or elsewhere. See Vanessa Blum, U.S. Building 
New Prisons for Terrorists; Construction of Guantanamo Jails Signals Long-Term Plans for Base, 
NAT’L LAW J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 3; see also Matt Moore & John J. Lumpkin, Some Detainees Have 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss2/4
2016] NEITHER FRIEND NOR FOE 297 
enemy fighters would not prevent U.S. forces from attacking.155 In 2002, 
the Bush Administration started the era of unmanned aerial vehicle 
warfare when an armed Predator drone fired a missile at a car containing 
suspected al Qaeda operative Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, killing him 
as well as five others, which included American citizen Kamal 
Derwish.156 As a mere foot soldier, it would have been unlikely that 
Hamdi would have been targeted specifically as a military target. But 
could he have been? It might seem silly to consider even the possibility 
in a counterfactual situation where Justice Scalia’s dissent carried the 
day, given that death would seem to be a worse personal outcome than 
indefinite detention. 
One can look for guidance to the Obama Administration’s 
increasing reliance on drone warfare in Afghanistan and other fronts in 
the war against al Qaeda. Even before Barack Obama assumed office, 
the Rasul-Hamdan-Boumedienne line of cases had already empowered 
federal courts to review the detention of individual detainees, making 
capture and detention of additional fighters a costly exercise in 
continuing litigation. President Obama’s campaign pledge to close the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility made it further politically infeasible 
to increase the population of detainees at the naval base. Perhaps 
predictably, these forces pushed the Obama Administration toward the 
more expedient route of attacking to kill via drone strikes. 
The most relevant example of this option for our purposes was 
Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and Muslim cleric who left the 
United States in late 2002 and eventually took up residence in Yemen, 
where he allegedly used video sermons to urge Muslim followers to 
engage in jihad as a recruiter for al Qaeda.157 Al-Awlaki was also linked 
to Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan, “underwear bomber” Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, and possibly to Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad.158 
Al-Awlaki posed little threat of physical danger to the United States, but 
his ability to attract more fighters to al Qaeda raised his threat profile 
enough in the eyes of the Obama Administration that it placed him on 
Returned to Terrorism, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 18, 2004, at A3. 
155. If nothing else, the attack could be legally justified within international humanitarian law 
(i.e., the laws of war) as intended to disable or kill the other members of the group; any harm to 
Hamdi could have been unintended even if expected. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for 
the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175 (2005).  
156. See Greg Miller & Josh Meyer, CIA Strike May Link 6 in U.S. to Al Qaeda, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 9, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/nov/09/world/fg-yemen9. 
157. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010). 
158. Id. 
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the “kill list.”159 On September 30, 2011, a Predator drone blasted the 
vehicle in which al-Awlaki was traveling, killing him and three others 
(including another American citizen, Samir Khan).160 
Al-Awlaki’s citizenship did not save him from being targeted for a 
drone strike. His father even brought a lawsuit in 2010 to challenge the 
government’s legal authority to target al-Awlaki for death without due 
process.161 The district court quickly dismissed the lawsuit on a variety 
of justiciability grounds, of which the important ones for our analysis 
were that the father lacked standing to bring the case on his son’s behalf, 
and that the entire case presented a non-justiciable political question.162 
After the successful drone attack, al-Awlaki’s father brought a second 
lawsuit on behalf of his son’s estate, raising Bivens claims of Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment violations.163 This lawsuit also failed, although the 
district judge did reach the merits of the claim (rather than dismissing it 
as a political question) by ruling that “special factors” counseled against 
implying a cause of action under the Bivens doctrine “[i]n this delicate 
area of war-making, national security, and foreign relations.”164 
Thus, under Justice Scalia’s principles, a hostile American citizen 
could not be captured on the battlefield and then detained for any 
purpose unless criminally charged, but at the same time, it would appear 
that the government could target that same hostile citizen for lethal 
attack, and the various justiciability doctrines would likely ensure that 
there would be no judicial recourse to stop the attack. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The notion that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi was some kind of 
ode to civil liberties or was defendant-friendly ends up in a strange 
place. It rejects the majority’s agreement that Hamdi was entitled to a 
hearing before a neutral decision maker to contest his classification as an 
enemy combatant, to notice of the allegations underlying that 
determination, and to assistance of counsel—all of which, if successful, 
would lead not just to his release, but also to clearing his name. One 
159. Id. at 11. 
160. See, e.g., Al Qaeda’s Anwar al-Awlaki killed in Yemen, CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011, 3:18
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaedas-anwar-al-awlaki-killed-in-yemen/. 
161. See Complaint for Declarative and Injunctive Relief, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-1469), http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Al-
Aulaqi%20v.%20Obama%20Complaint.pdf. 
162. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 23-24, 35, 52. 
163. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014). 
164. Id. at 78, 80. 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss2/4
2016] NEITHER FRIEND NOR FOE 299 
might argue that such process, while an improvement upon what existed 
before, would still fall short of a hearing before an Article III court 
through a formal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. However, it is far 
better than what Justice Scalia would have wrought: prosecution of 
Hamdi for betraying a country to which he had no connection; 
suspension altogether of habeas, leaving him in military detention with 
no way to challenge his classification; or release under circumstances 
where he would still be viewed as part of the enemy and subject to lethal 
attack. From a process perspective, this seems backwards. 
In the end, judging by Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, it would appear that 
Justice Scalia was neither friend nor foe of a criminal defendant, but 
rather something more like the nutty uncle who kept talking about the 
way things have always been done, even when those ways might not 
make sense any more. Certainly, Hamdi was much better off with Justice 
Scalia in the dissent than in the majority in his case. True, the 
assessment of whether Justice Scalia’s criminal procedure jurisprudence 
favors defendants should not depend on the ultimate result of an 
individual case or set of cases, but rather on the impact of the underlying 
doctrinal principles. It is worth observing, however, that as between 
John Walker Lindh and Yaser Hamdi, both American citizens captured 
in Afghanistan, the one who was treated as a criminal defendant was 
definitely not “better off.” Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
his case in 2004, Hamdi was able to reach a settlement with the Bush 
Administration that resulted in his repatriation to Saudi Arabia under 
conditions similar to house arrest, in exchange for his relinquishment of 
his American citizenship and his agreement not to engage in hostile 
actions against the United States. Hamdi spent less than three years in 
captivity.165 Lindh, on the other hand, received a sentence of twenty 
years of imprisonment; if he receives the maximum fifteen percent 
reduction of time for good behavior, he will still end up serving 
seventeen years. 
165. See, e.g., ‘Enemy Combatant’ Sees Freedom, CBS NEWS (Sept. 27, 2004),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/enemy-combatant-sees-freedom/. To be sure, the conditions of 
confinement during that time, particularly during the early period when he was held 
incommunicado, were no doubt even harsher than those experienced in a federal penitentiary. 
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